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The paper discusses the most important elements of an institutional order for a
globalizing world economy. Rules for the exchange of goods, for factor move-
ments, for the monetary domain and for the allocation of the environment are
distinguished. It is analyzed in which direction these rules should be developed.
The interdependence of the institutional order for these different areas is dis-
cussed.
J.E.L-Klassifikation: F02I. Rules in a Globalizing World Economy
1. The world economy is characterized by the increasing globalization and
greater interdependence of economic decisions. Transaction costs based on
geographical distance are becoming less important. Declining transport costs
per unit of output, more efficient, internationally operating communication net-
works, new organizational technologies for fragmenting production and the re-
moval of barriers to international exchange have reduced the market segmen-
tation for goods, services and capital. The allocation mechanism, the world
market, is becoming more global, and the international division of labor is also
more global — but as in the past economic decisions are still decentralized.
Through modern forms of organization they can be even more strongly decen-
tralized.
2. In order to ensure that the international division of labor can occur without
disturbances, that transactions will not be burdened with uncertainty, that all
countries can derive the greatest possible prosperity from international ex-
change, and that individual countries will have a net advantage from a globaliz-
ing world economy, an institutional order is needed. The basic idea for such a
world economic order (Vosgerau 1989) must be that the international division of
labor should capture the potential welfare gains between countries endowed
with different production factors and different preferences to the advantage of
the participating economies.
3. A central element of the institutional framework for a globalizing world econ-
omy is that states voluntarily commit themselves to respect rules which prevent
strategic behavior by individual countries. Behavior should be prevented that
distorts the gains from the international division of labor to the advantage of in-
dividual countries — whether apparently or actually, whether long-term or short-
I appreciate critical comments from Daniel Piazolo.term. Otherwise the potential gains from international exchange could become
smaller or even negative. The rules must prevent uncooperative behavior by
states; without eliminating competition among states, the rules must induce
them to act cooperatively (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 513). Self-commitment
by states limits national governments' choice of actions and in this sense repre-
sents a negative catalogue. It protects international competition against national
governments (Tumlir 1983: 72). The self-commitment of states is also a shelter
from the power of protectionist groups in the individual economies.
An international order which develops in the course of time (Axelrod 1986,
North 1990) represents a public good. It defines the international economic
constitution from an economic perspective (Moser 1989). Regardless of such
general rules, households, firms and states have varying action parameters —
an institutional order should not be mis-understood as a pre-harmonization of
the specific actions. There will always be great variety of economic conditions in
the world economy — for example, in the prices for non-tradable goods and for
immobile production factors such as wages.
4. The contents of the institutional arrangement depend on the different types
of interdependence among countries. Traditionally, foreign trade policy rules
intended to facilitate trade have mattered. Recently, there have been discus-
sions about socio-political norms as well as about rules for services and com-
petition policies. Norms for the mobility of production factors — physical capital,
labor and technology — are receiving increasing attention in the economic pol-
icy discussion. There are periodic calls for agreements on the exchange rates.
Finally, norms for the use of the environment will acquire greater significance in
the future (Table 1).Table 1 — Elements of an institutional order for the world economy
Type of interdependence









(4) Diffusion of Pollutants
Distortions, Disturbances
Protectionistic foreign trade
policy (tariffs, import quotas,
"voluntary" export restraints,
strategic trade policy and in-
dustrial policy, anti-dumping,
subsidies, product standards).
Calls for uniform social norms.
Market power of firms.
Discrimination against foreign
suppliers.
Not respecting property rights
internationally reduces the in-
centive for technological pro-
gress.




Volatility of exchange rates.
Misuse of national environ-
mental policy for strategic
trade purposes; free rider be-
havior of individual countries in
regard to global environmental
problems.
Rules
Trade rules, above all against new
forms of protectionistic trade policy;
country-of-origin principle for norms.
No worldwide standardization possible.
Competition rules. Free access to mar-
kets. Competition authorities?
National treatment.
Property rights which protect new
knowledge but permit gradual dissemi-
nation.
Governments compete using their infra-
structure, tax system and regulations for
mobile capital. Consequently, national
self-interest impels countries to make
themselves more attractive to outside
capital. Aside from this no international
rules are necessary.
Free trade and free movements of capi-
tal as a substitute for labor migration. A
right to emigrate (right of exit). Open-
ness in immigration policy. Not achiev-
able; a universal right of immigration.
Each country must keep the value of its
money stable. Discretionary macro-
economic coordination is not possible
unless each country submits itself to
rules giving up sovereignty similar to
the gold standard.
International rules only for transfrontier
and global environmental problems. Na-
tional, environmental problems are sub-
ject to national environmental policy.
Separation between environmental poi-
icy and trade policy.II. In the Center: Rules for the Exchange of Goods
5. The rule system of the World Trade Organization is intended to make strate-
gic behavior by individual countries more difficult and to strengthen cooperative
behavior. In the future it should be further developed and strengthened.
In the international economic order quite a few positive tendencies can be
seen. In eight tariff reduction rounds since 1948 countries' traditional trade pol-
icy arsenals have been reduced. The principle of non-discrimination, embodied
in the GATT by the most-favored-nation and national treatment obligations,
aims at precluding the discriminatory application of trade policy measures. The
most-favored-nation obligation is intended to multilateralize the reduction of
trade barriers. The concept of reciprocity of concessions, although based on
mercantilist ideas, is also intended to serve this aim.
However, there are many reasons why free market access can not be estab-
lished in this framework (Gundlach et al. 1996, Langhammer 1995):
— Countries have circumvented tariff liberalization through other restrictions,
such as voluntary self-restraint agreements and export guidelines. The world
trade order could not quickly integrate the newly-appearing forms of trade
policy instruments into its rules.
— Escape clauses still allow protective measures in the case of sudden in-
creases in imports and in the case of export subsidies, even on a selective
basis against individual suppliers.
— Anti-dumping measures have a protectionistic character, especially since
they entail uncertainty and since the threat of anti-dumping measures can
lead to "voluntary" self-restraint agreements.
— Sectoral exemptions from the non-discrimination principle and from the
most-favored-nation treatment in the domains of agriculture and textiles re-
present a violation of the basic concept of the international division of labor.— Finally, even after the Uruguay Round the World Trade Organization still
•disposes of only a very weak sanctioning mechanism against countries
which deviate from the rules. Its dispute settlement mechanism is only acti-
vated if individual states request it, and even then the new World Trade Or-
ganization has only the possibility of moral sanctions. Retaliatory measures
approved by the World Trade Organization usually have no effect when
employed by individual states against large trading nations. Furthermore, the
World Trade Organization cannot bring charges against countries on its own
authority. . •. .
6. The muliiiaterai irading system is not effectively protected against aggressive
bilateral trade policy. It is desirable to limit bilateralism.
An aggressive trade policy on the part of the leading trading nations and re-
gions of the world endangers the multilateral trading system. The United States
and the European Union have set up new arsenals of trade policy instruments.
These can be employed as retaliatory measures or market openers without re-
gard for the mechanisms of the world trade order (Sachverstandigenrat
1994/95: Number 405). Thus with its instrument "Super 301" the USA can react
within the shortest period against trade policy measures of other countries. It
can independently introduce trade-limiting measures against individual states.
Agreed-on preferential trade treatment can be canceled, import restrictions im-
posed and bilateral export limitation agreements arranged. With the "new trade
policy instrument" the European Union has created a similar apparatus. Using
these trade policy weapons the two trading blocs, in the sense of result-oriented
bilaterally conceived systems (Dombusch 1990), have exempted themselves
from the rules of the multilateral world trade order (Klodt,; Stehn et al. 1994:
119). The danger exists that bilateral measures will escalate and that the multi-
lateral order will thereby degenerate. The trade policy instruments of such an
aggressive market opening policy must be integrated into the rules of the world
trade order. A result-oriented, bilaterally conceived aggressive trade policy for
opening markets must not supplant a rule based, multilateral order.The territorial exception from the principle of most-favored-nation treatment
which holds for regional integrations conjures up the fundamental danger that
the multilateral order will disintegrated into regional blocs. However, on the ba-
sis of previous experience regional integration has not led to significant seg-
mentation. The regional integration efforts in Latin America have tended to re-
main weak; the new regional integration in East Asia (APEC) is geared to mar-
ket integration and is not set to create external barriers. European integration
has had attractive power — it has not closed itself to the possibility of accepting
additional members. Through their growth, cum grano salis, the trade diversion
effects at the expense of third parties are, despite protectionistic interventions,
probably overcompensated. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)
lacks the internal coherence found in the European Union. Nevertheless, the
danger cannot be dismissed that regional blocs could become entangled in an
escalating trade war. Thus in the case of a conflict between the blocs, NAFTA
could, even without a de jure common trade policy, tend to reinforce a possible
aggressive trade policy on the part of the United States. It is therefore important
to find mechanisms which multilateralize regional integration. For example, re-
gional trade areas should be kept open for new members. They could commit
themselves to "realize the results of the GATT Rounds more quickly than
planned, liberalize more than agreed and employ the permitted exceptions less
often" (Sachverstandigenrat 1994/95: Number 406). Such a GATT-plus could
advance the integration process in the world economy. This also holds for
dovetailing various regional blocs by establishing a free trade zone between the
blocs, perhaps for a trans-Atlantic economic area (cf. Siebert et al. 1996). One
way to'do this is for the members of integrated regions to grant concessions to
third countries, in the sense of limited most-favored-nation treatment (Klodt,
Stehnetal. 1994: 118).
7. National subsidies which distort the international, division of labor must be re-
duced. ''.'."•Through subsidies governments attempt to lower their producers' production
costs so that an artificial price advantage arises. One conceivable response to
this would be simply to tolerate national subsidies, since a subsidizing country
does not employ its resources optimally, and thereby accepts a loss of welfare.
One should not, however, be complacent about this. Subsidies by one country
take market shares away from the corresponding sectors of other countries and
lead to political demands for retaliation. Thus their effect resembles those of
protectionist measures. Similar to trade rules, therefore, the existing subsidy
code, of which the beginnings are in principle present in the world trade order,
must be further developed in order to prevent subsidy competition between
governments. According to the rules of the World Trade Organization, subsidies
for export goods and import substitutes are forbidden and product- and indus-
try-specific subsidies are inadmissible when they would harm the trade oppor-
tunities of other members. Even so it is difficult to demarcate subsidy practices
from other admissible practices such as research assistance and aid in adapt-
ing to new environmental technologies. It is likewise difficult to punish and stop
violations in the framework of monitoring processes. Furthermore, important
sectors such as agriculture and the aviation industry are exempted. How diffi-
cult it is to monitor subsidies is shown by the European Union's aid supervision.
8. Border-crossing disembodied services should be treated like commodities.
With embodied services national treatment can be employed to keep markets
open.
In the case of services, a distinction should be made between "disembodied"
and "embodied" services (Klodt, Stehn et al. 1994: 128). Disembodied services
are not "embodied" in persons, for example, detail engineering using computer
supported programs, the development of software and the adoption of account-
ing systems. For these services no difference from material goods can be
found. Just as commodities are carried by the transport system, disembodied
services cross national borders by means of communication media. As a con-sequence, markets must be open for them just as they must be for com-
modities.
in the case of person-embodied services, non-discrimination can be guaran-
teed through national treatment. With person-embodied services two cases are
to be systematically distinguished. For one thing, foreign enterprises may have
a comparative advantage relative to domestic enterprises as a result of their or-
ganization, technical knowledge or other factors, without lower labor costs being
the decisive factor. For example, a foreign insurance company may have a
more favorable risk structure. In this case, national treatment opens up market
access. Furthermore, with person-embodied services comparative advantages
may be based on the factor of labor alone, in which case national treatment of
foreign suppliers is especially controversial. But even in this case it accords with
the basic concept of the international division of labor that market access must
be free. It must permit suppliers from other countries to offer their services at
the prices prevailing in the country-of-origin.
9. The rules for the international division of labor must aim more strongly at
establishing free access to markets. They must therefore also include domains
which go beyond trade policy, such as national regulations and national com-
petition policy.
The trade order is essentially oriented to denying governments or integrated
regions tariff and non-tariff instruments with which the governments could di-
rectly intervene in trade flows at their borders. Such instruments should be out-
lawed through a negative catalogue. However, this still does not guarantee that
there.will be free access to markets. If we want to ensure this, it will be neces-
sary that:
— National regulations do not limit access for goods and firms.
— National competition policies are not oriented to the advantage of domestic
enterprises.— National competition policies or an international competition policy do not
permit firms to build up or exploit monopolistic positions.
Structural barriers which limit effective access to markets should be. dismantled.
These barriers can include economic policy measures in the broadest sense,
such as licensing procedures for economic activities, for facilities and products,
technical standards, arrangements for the public contract system and interlock-
ing ties between firms (as with Keiretsu in Japan) on the same or different lev-
els of the vertical production structure, whereby outsiders are excluded (Ostry
1995).
10. In regard to national regulations the country-of-origin principle can maintain
the openness of markets.
Recently the tendency has become apparent to link market access more
strongly to agreement with the national regulations of the country-of-destination.
Such conditions set up additional barriers to the international division of labor,
for the country-of-destination principle contradicts the world trade rules which
aim at non-discrimination and reducing market segmentation. The different
regulations of national countries-of-origin should rather have equal standing
competing with each other. A weakening of the country-of-origin principle and a
strengthening of the country-of-destination principle will inevitably harm the
multilateral order. The goal of the world trade order is therefore in principle to
accept the regulations of the country-of-origin for product quality and production
processes in order to minimize transaction costs. Only in precisely demarcated
cases, for example, public health protection, should the country-of-destination
and its standards take precedence over the norms of the country-of-origin. But
even then the measures adopted should involve neither discrimination nor pro-
tection, and they must satisfy the commensurability of means standard.
11. A world-wide harmonization of social norms should be avoided.10
Recently there have been increased calls to equalize social norms (on envi-
ronmental norms see below), and this is supposed to be accomplished through
trade policy measures. Countries which do not employ these standards are
supposed to be denied access to markets elsewhere. Above all the developing
countries would be negatively affected. For reasons such as lower labor pro-
ductivity these countries are unable to pay the same wages that industrialized
countries can, and for similar reasons neither can they be expected to adopt
these countries' social norms. Also in this domain the country-of-destination
principle cannot be practiced in the world trade order. What regulations are set
for the production of goods should consequently be left to the discretion of the
country-of-origin. Besides, trade policy is unsuitable as a means of harmoniza-
tion.
12, In an international economic order, competition policy has the task of
counteracting business practices intended to reduce the contestability of mar-
kets and preventing the exploitation of market power.
Markets must not be closed through the market power of firms. The globaliza-
tion of world markets does make markets more competitive, and in this sense
free trade is the best competition policy; all measures which reduce distortions
and increase market access support competition policy. However, globalization
also enables enterprises to orient their international policies with the aim to
create monopolistic positions and to exploit them in structuring prices to the
disadvantage of buyers.
In competition policy (Vosgerau 1995) an international institutional framework
which could restrict the misuse.of monopolistic market positions and discourage
competition-limiting mergers is not presently foreseeable. Currently the interna-
tional community does not appear close to an agreement on a right of com-
plaint which parties injured by anti-competitive policies could employ before an
international court or an international competition authority empowered to en-
force competition rules (Scherer 1994). Thus at present we can only expect to11
establish a few minimal competition policy rules for countries or regional inte-
grations (such as the European Union), either in the framework of the World
Trade Organization (Immenga 1995) or the OECD. We must also consider the
option that initially only some of the rules would be agreed upon by the most
important OCED countries, because there are fundamental differences in their
legal systems, as between Anglo-Saxon and Continental European law. What
will be necessary is to change the orientation of national competition policies.
Restrictions on competition which domestic enterprises impose abroad will
have to be taken into account so that a country harmed by another country's
competition policy will have the right to obtain changes in the objectionable
competition policy. An institutional consultation- and sanctioning mechanism
must be created (Graham 1995). The details of how a framework for competi-
tion policy can be achieved is currently being intensively discussed in the litera-
ture. Under consideration are the effects doctrine with an international right to
extra-territorial legal application (Immenga 1995, Klodt 1995), treaty agree-
ments — including bilateral treaties between the USA and Europe — on the
concession of mutual competencies (Ehlermann 1995), the harmonization of
international competition law (hard law) on the basis of national legal system
(Fikentscher and Immenga 1995) and the competition of institutional rules
through mutual recognition, thus a Cassis-de-Dijon approach with an interna-
tional interpretation (Nicolaides 1994).
III. New in the Foreground: Rules for Factor Migrations
13. Besides the exchange of goods, factor migrations are a further important
form of interdependency between economies. Countries compete for mobile
technical knowledge and mobile capital. If an economy succeeds in attracting
mobile production factors or in keeping them from leaving the country, the real
income for the immobile production factors increases, especially for labor.
Factor migrations are interlinked with the exchange of goods in complex ways.
In the case of technology and non-financial capital, factor migrations can occur12
through trade in goods or they even themselves represent trade in goods, as
with the purchase or sale of user rights, for example, patents. They can, in a
comparative-static sense, take the place of movements of goods and thus
serve as a substitute to commodity flows, but in a dynamic perspective they
can, in the sense of acquired comparative advantage, also decisively influence
future comparative advantages and thereby be forerunners for future ex-
changes of goods.
14. An institutional arrangement for technical knowledge must be found which,
by respecting property rights, would offer sufficient incentives for individual
economies to search for new knowledge, but simultaneously would not in the
long term block possible diffusion of new knowledge throughout the world.
With technology rules a problem must be solved which is similar to that of
structuring a national patent system. On the one hand, user rights to new tech-
nical knowledge must be secure, since otherwise there will be insufficient in-
centives to search for and adopt new technical knowledge. This means that
property rights to new knowledge must be respected throughout the world. On
the other hand, this property protection must not create permanently exclusive
positions and make markets uncompetitive. Rather, the diffusion of new knowl-
edge must be possible after a certain passage of time; accordingly time limits
should be set on the protective effect of user rights. The optimal duration of
protective rights depends among other things on product life cycles and the
time frame of research and development phases; this can differ greatly from
product to product. Since countries may have an interest in protecting their
firms' technological knowledge for as long as possible (although this reduces
the incentives for their own technological dynamics), the solution cannot consist
simply in mutually recognizing national patent laws. Rather, it may be desirable
to set time limits on the validity of national patents.
National technology policy should be dealt with in the same way as national
subsidies. The chances of a strategic technology policy succeeding when it is6es Instifuts fur Weltwirtschef
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sector-specifically limited to certain industries are slight (Klodt 1995). If we pur-
sue this viewpoint, we can be sure that the problem will be solved in the self-
interest of individual countries. Nevertheless the problem arises of how sector-
specific interests can be controlled. Thus the international subsidy code must
set limits for industry-specific research subsidies. In contrast, there is no need
in institutional regulations concerning the improvement of the general conditions
for research and development, for example, when countries generally improve
the tax framework conditions for research and development, innovation, in-
vestment and entrepreneurial activity, as well as organize basic research and
further technology transfer so that they can be internationally competitive.
15. In the case of non-financial capital it is sufficient to give the production fac-
tor capital the exit option and to leave capital mobility to the locational competi-
tion of governments.
We can surely start by assuming that it is in the best interest of each country to
keep capital at home and attract more capital from outside. Each country
should structure its institutional framework accordingly, thus provide for the se-
curity of property rights, avoid uncertainty about corporate taxes, develop a tax
system and general economic framework conditions which make the country
attractive as a location and prepare an efficient infrastructure. Although bilateral
agreements can make the direct investments of the sending country more se-
cure for its companies, and multilateral agreements may make potential recipi-
ent countries appear less risky for direct investments, in the end it is the host
country's responsibility to enhance its own attractiveness.
Capital mobility limits national governments' freedom of action and changes the
opportunity costs of economic-policy decisions. This holds not only for the case
when capital should be attracted, but also when its emigration should be pre-
vented. Each economic-policy consideration, even those about taxes, the crea-
tion of infrastructure and regulations must be submitted to cost-benefit com-
parison. On balance economic welfare should be increased. The costs of14
choices — these are always opportunity costs, i.e. the costs of missed oppor-
tunities — are more serious if capital can choose between various locations.
An important condition for atr efficient international division of labor is therefore
that capital should not be prevented from seeking better opportunities for em-
ployment abroad. Otherwise countries would force their savers to invest solely
at i home. The allocation of savings would then be inefficient. An explicit exit
right for capital is thereby a decisive element of the international division of
labor.
The fear that Iocational competition will degenerate as a result of capital mobil-
ity is unfounded (Siebert 1996a). Despite high taxation rates, non-financial
capital-will not migrate if the immobile labor supply possesses suitable qualifi-
cations, if human capital is thus well developed and if infrastructure capital is
adequate. Capital taxation can thus be compensated for within limits through
the quality of public production factors, if these are financed in the sense of the
equivalency principle (of benefit taxation) from taxes or user prices. Rising
marginal costs of production with lower human capital and poorer infrastructure
ensure that Iocational competition for mobile capital finds a self-imposed lower
limit: The better its provision of human- and infrastructure capital, the less a
country needs to fear Iocational competition.
16. In all countries citizens should be guaranteed an exit option as a civil liberty.
The openness of goods markets and the mobility of capital reduce the necessity
of migration.
The right of individuals to leave a country, thus the exit option, can be inter-
preted as an important element of a liberal order. The individual should have
the opportunity to choose to leave given life conditions which he or she finds
unacceptable. A credible right to exit which is respected by the government of
the potential country-of-emigration is as a rule a limit on the actions of that gov-15
ernment and should through this implicit control of governmental actions reduce
the incentive for individuals to emigrate.
The exit option does not, however, imply the right to immigrate into any given
country. States define their identity by setting their immigration poiicy (Hillman
1994). This creates difficult ethical questions which can be resolved if potential
countries of immigration — beyond the duty to accept the politically persecuted
— are sufficiently open and if regional integrations such as the European Un-
ion, although only spatially limited from an international economic perspective,
guarantee freedom of movement within their territory. For many reasons labor
migration should be replaced by the movement of goods and capital mobility. If
a country finds open markets for its goods elsewhere and attracts capital, its
citizens do not need to emigrate. The strengthening of an international eco-
nomic order for the international exchange of goods and the openness of mar-
kets reduces the necessity of migration.
IV. An Old Acquaintance: Rules for the Monetary Domain
17. Monetary transaction costs must not burden the international division of la-
bor. The international division of labor presupposes currency convertibility.
It is considerably harder to profit from the international division of labor if cur-
rency convertibility is limited by different countries' political decisions. This in-
cludes restricting the convertibility of currency for foreigners or citizens, setting
different exchange rates for different transaction purposes, for example, for
goods considered more or less important or for movements of goods and capi-
tal, granting privileged access to better exchange rates, as in a system of im-
port licenses, and exchange rate protectionism. This has negative conse-
quences for the exchange of goods and the efficient allocation of capital.16
Therefore as a rule the need for currency convertibility is accepted today.
1 Es-
pecially after the experiences of the thirties countries made efforts during the
period of reconstruction following the Second World War to ensure convertibility
and liberalize capital movements. In recent years the pendulum has threatened
to swing in the opposite direction because of the volatility of nominal exchange
rates.
18. Stable exchange rates are only possible if all countries voluntarily obligate
themselves to a stable, credible currency system, or if they assign high policy
priority to the stability of their own money.
Exchange rate volatility leads time and again to demands for greater stability in
the international currency system. It is incontestable that nominal exchange
rates are greatly influenced by financial flows, that they can overshoot leading
to distorted trade flows. There can also be speculative bubbles. But it should be
remembered that trade flows depend not on nominal but on real exchange
rates, and that too often — if not always — the triggers for exchange rate vola-
tility are political ones reflecting economic policy, above all stabilization policy,
monetary and also real economic changes. Exchange rate movements thus
represent a barometer of fundamental disturbances.
Economic policy recommendations for limiting the volatility of exchange rates
should be regarded skeptically: . .
— It will not prove possible to set up reference zones for exchange rates
(Williamson 1983), if the conditions for stability are not fulfilled.
— The idea of a return to a system analogous to that of Bretton Woods ignores
the fact that financial markets are now globalized.
1 On the question of how to arrange a transition to convertibility over time cf. Quirk
(1994).17
— Throwing sand into the gears of international financial markets (Tobin-tax;
Tobin 1978) works against the aim of reducing transaction costs.
A solution could be for countries to submit to a system which would guarantee
stability. Historically the gold standard was such a system. Countries refrained
from employing a national stabilization policy. They accepted fluctuations in
output and employment in order to maintain exchange rate stability. Such an
approach is not internationally practical today: For one thing, no anchor is visi-
ble on the horizon; gold can hardly serve as such an anchor. For another, a
readiness to submit to an international rule system is lacking.
Small countries can solve the problem of excessive volatility in their exchange
rates with an exchange rate oriented monetary policy (the Netherlands, Austria)
or a currency board (Argentina, Estonia). They attach themselves to a country
with a stable price level. This has often succeeded in the short-term, but in the
mid-term it entails great pressure toward monetary, fiscal and wage policy ad-
aptation to the situation in the anchor country. For large countries this solution
is as a rule politically unacceptable. In addition, a larger country must be the
stability leader. Under these conditions a solution can only consist in each indi-
vidual country keeping its own house in order and maintaining stable domestic
price levels. Then exchange rates will generally remain stable.
V. Tasks for the Future: Rules for the Use of the Environment
19. Insofar as the environment is a national endowment factor, prices can bring
the different environmental scarcities of countries to expression. The environ-
ment is then fundamentally not the object of an international rule system.
Countries are not only interdependent in terms of goods, production factors and
monetary transactions; they also influence each other through the use of nature
and the environment as receptacles for wastes and emissions. However, a dis-18
tinction should be made between whether national usage rights are definable
for nature and the environment or whether global or border-crossing environ-
mental goods are at stake.
Similar to the way countries are differently endowed with natural raw materials,
there are also territorial differences in the capacity of nature for use in waste
disposal-. The absorptive and regenerative capacities of regional environments
vary. Heavy population density makes it more difficult to spatially separate resi-
dential and recreational areas from environmentally-degrading transport and
production activities. The preferences of countries for environmental quality can
differ as well. If the environment is an immobile resource factor, the prices for
environmental services — as a receptacle of wastes — must also differ be-
tween countries. Different environmental scarcities will thus be signaled by dif-
ferent prices. A market economy approach to environmental policy which taxes
hazardous wastes or establishes prices for environmental services through li-
censing is consistent with an institutional framework for the international divi-
sion of labor.
20: If environmental policy employs a regulatory approach to national environ-
ments, the non-discrimination and country-of-origin principles should apply.
The measures employed by countries to protect their citizens' health and life
and to conserve natural resources (Article XX of the GATT Treaty) must be
non-discriminatory. Non-discrimination requires that in the case of market entry
restrictions, regulations through production permits, facility permits and product
norms must not give preference to domestic producers and domestic goods.
Thus it should not be permissible, for example, with the aim of reducing health
hazards, as in the Thailand cigarette case (1990), to restrict the import of goods
or to tax them unless the same measures are simultaneously taken against
similar domestic goods. The similarity of the goods plays a crucial role in non-
discrimination. Similarity of products should be defined from the demand side,
for example, in terms of possible harmful effects, and not from the production19
side. As in the Mexican-American tuna fish case (1991), the principle of similar-
ity should not be applied to the production methods (in the tuna fish case meth-
ods of fishing which do not sufficiently protect dolphins). This means that the
country-of-origin principle should apply. Non-discrimination should also satisfy
the condition that means should accord with the proportionality principle. Meas-
ures must accordingly be necessary in the sense that otherwise environmental
policy aims or the protection of natural resources could not be achieved. As a
rule, these aims are, however, better achieved through specific environmental
policy measures rather than through trade policy, which cannot influence the
share of production which remains in the producer's domestic market.
21. Trade policy must not be employed to force national preferences on other
countries. Any country's environmental policy should not apply to external ef-
fects outside its own territorial area.
Since countries have different amounts of environmental resources and also
different environmental preferences, those with stronger environmental prefer-
ences should not be entitled to impose their environmental preferences on
other countries by means of trade-restricting measures (Siebert 1996b). The
thesis that the country-of-origin principle should be fundamentally recognized
for national environments is generalizable. If harmful effects appear outside a
country's territorial area, countries should not have the right to use trade policy
to influence the production methods of a country-of-origin. Also, the protective
clauses for health, life and exhaustible resources found in Article XX should in
the case of national environmental goods be applied only within a country's own
territorial area. Countries should thus not have the right to employ unilateral
measures to protect the environment in other countries.
22. In the case of global environmental goods a multilateral regime should be
developed.20,
Global environmental goods
2 are public goods with a world wide spatial dimen-
sion. In what amounts and with what quality these public goods should be pro-
duced requires the agreement of all countries. What must be decided on is not
just the extent to which emissions should be reduced, but rather also the proper
distribution of costs among individual countries. It is difficult to reach interna-
tional consensus, because countries have different preferences and because
they have different per capita incomes. In addition, the cost functions for dis-
posal differ from country to country. To what extent a stable international envi-
ronmental framework with voluntary commitments by states can be created un-
der these conditions using compensatory payments is a complex issue and has
been the subject of numerous studies (Stahler 1996).
23. The international environmental order and the international trade order must
have consistent aims. The rules of both orders must, however, not be contin-
gent upon each other. The set of instruments of both orders must be kept sepa-
rate.
Environmental policy aims at protecting the natural conditions for life. An insti-
tutional order for the international division of labor should make it possible to in-
crease the prosperity of all countries through exchange. Since environmental
policy and international trade intersect at many points, the regulations in both
frameworks should not conflict. The aims are not in principle contradictory,
since affluence must be. defined by taking the natural conditions for life into ac-
count. If we accept the principle that the valuation of the goods on which afflu-
ence is based, as well as the valuation of environmental quality, must depend
on the formation of national will, a contradiction between both regimes can be .
avoided.
In the past international arrangements for environmental questions and the
world trade order were developed separately and independently. In the future it
2 On transfrontier environmental systems see Siebert (1995: Chapter 12).21
will be important to pay more attention in the case of environmental agreements
to the consistency of both orders. The more successfully the environment as a
scarce good is integrated into the economic orders of individual countries and
the more affluence is defined by taking into account nature and the environ-
ment, the sooner congruence of targets will be achieved between both orders.
Compared to the administrative approach using regulations, market economy
approaches to environmental policy provide more congruence between both
sets of rules. The sooner the polluter-pays principle is accepted as a guideline
by all countries not only for national, but also for global environmental goods,
the easier it will be to achieve consistency of the two orders in the case of
global environmental concerns.
3
Beyond efforts toward congruence of targets, the following orientational points
could minimize aim conflicts:
— The rules in the world environmental order and the world trade order should
not be mutually conditional. This would cause considerable uncertainty not
only in the international division of labor, but also in the production of envi-
ronmental goods.
— Judging from past experience it appears ill-advised to. create a temporary
waiver for environmental issues as an exception to the world trade order.
One reason is that the previously created exemptions for the agricultural and
textile sectors have become resistant to change and have led to a perma-
nent infringement of the most-favored-nation principle. If an exceptional
regulation is questionable even in the case of.internationally declining sec-
tors, then a similar procedure appears still less desirable for an area that will
be increasingly important in the future.
3 We could also consider a minimal solution which would define deviation in terms of
the current state. Since, however, the costs of maintaining a given state of the
environment differ from country to country, acceptance is doubtful. Cf. the
discussion on the victim-pays principle for cases of border-crossing environmental
problems (Siebert 1995).22
—• Non-discrimination and the priority of the country-of-origin principle over the
country-of-destination principle can divide the instrumental level between
both sets of rules.
— Trade policy instruments should not be employed for environmental policy
purposes. Countries should not have the right to apply their environmental
policy conceptions outside their own territory.
— The mediation of disputes by the World Trade Organization should be ex-
tended to include the environmental domain.
— In the case of global environmental goods the bottom line is that the polluter-
pays principle should define national responsibility for deviations from the
present situation.
VI. On the Stability and Interdependence of the Orders
24. The world economic order must be stable. This presupposes that countries
gain advantages from it. The benefits for individual countries should increase
over the course of time in a growing world economy.
Arvessential condition for the creation and permanence of an international eco-
nomic order is that the institutional framework should be acceptable to all
countries, thus that all countries can expect to profit from it. The transition from
non-cooperative to cooperative behavior must create benefits for all countries.
Furthermore, when the rules are expanded the advantages of membership
must be greater for each country than the advantages of non-membership. For
the stability of institutional arrangements it is crucial that the individual country's
cost-benefit calculations should not shift asymmetrically and that the net advan-
tage for each country should increase and in no case worsen. If this condition is
not fulfilled, there will be an incentive not to honor the treaty, but instead to
withdraw from it.23
25. The interdependence of the suborders should be taken into consideration in
the development of the overall rule system. In applying the rules, to the con-
trary, interdependence should play no role.
Inevitably the suborders are interdependent, in Eucken's sense (cf. 1992).
Three aspects are relevant. First: A suborder can give one country relatively
more advantages, while another suborder may be advantageous for another
country. A greater advantage from a suborder can compensate for the lesser
advantage of anothe
r suborder if the orders are in principle accepted, this as-
pect is significant for the acceptance of new suborders. However, this
"offsetting" between the advantages of suborders should not be carried too far.
If in the course of time the advantages of countries shift asymmetrically in the
individual suborders, a fragile structure of acceptance could collapse like a
house of cards. To avoid domino effects, it makes sense that the suborders
should basically legitimate themselves on their own and not be conditionally ac-
cepted. Second: Suborders must be mutually consistent. One suborder must
not lead to behavior on the part of economic subjects which contradicts and
undermines some other suborder. As a consequence, suborders must agree on
aims. An important example of this consistency is the world trade order and the
world environmental order. Third: One suborder should not in practice depend
on another order. The validity of one suborder should thus not depend on the
functioning of some other order. This means that the instrumental level should
be clearly-separated. Economic policy instruments should be limited to specific
suborders. Trade policy instruments should not be employed for environmental
policy purposes; the instrumental level should thus be modularly subdivided
and demarcated.24
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